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[. . .] our investigations are historical in an unusual sense, namely in virtue of a thematic direction which
opens up depth-problems quite unknown to ordinary history.
(Edmund Husserl, 1970: 354)
What could this be other than a sign that each effort or even each desire of a mastery of the past was
momentarily exchanged for a submission to the spell of the moment?
(Frank Ankersmit, 2005: 16)
A B S T R A C T
In “Sublime historical experience” (2005), Frank Ankersmit argues that the past
AQ1
originates from an experience of rupture. Such an experience of rupture separates
the present from the past, and, at the same time, means the beginning of an effort to
overcome the separation. Moreover, the experience is precognitive since it precedes
(the possibility of) historical knowledge. As such, it is a condition of possibility
for history. Ankersmit resists post-modern thinking about history, considered as
too relativizing from the perspective of current philosophy of history. In his view,
the focus on text and context, but also the emphasis on categories in transcen-
dental thinking, result in a neglect of experience. Experience should be given its
due, also in philosophy of history. Starting from the above challenge, the “origi-
nal beginnings”, which Husserl posits as meaning-origins of a particular history in
The Origin of Geometry (cf. appendix 6 to The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, 1970) are questioned from a transcendental per-
spective. More in particular, it will be investigated if these meaning-origins are to be
grasped as structural and nachträglich, in a Derridean style, or if they are to be con-
sidered as founding moments of experience, probably in a more Merleau-Pontian
style. At stake is here the transcendental status of the first acquisition. Is the point
from which a historical demarcation is being made, and thus also the meaning-origin
itself, a matter of interpretation after the facts or is it the witness of a supposedly
genuine experience? The differences between these two options are both subtle and
crucial for transcendental thinking today. In the conclusions, we point to the im-
portance of thinking the possibility of history in structural terms, and to different
possible appreciations of the spiritual products of culture and more specifically, of
works of art.
A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana CVIII, XX–XX.
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0624-8_22, C© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
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T H E T R E A S U R E D I S C O V E R E D O R M A D E U P ?
In this contribution, the possible status of “original beginnings” in Husserl’s thought
is explored. Due to the peculiar mixture between the empirical and the ideal order,
the matter is quite complicated. In its most simple, but misleading, form, the is-
sue can be put in the following metaphorical terms: is the treasure – buried in the
past – discovered, or is it made up in the present time? In other words, are “original
beginnings” a matter of experience, i.e. a supposedly genuine experience in which
self-evidence plays a central role, or is it rather the case that its present in the past is
retrospectively presupposed?
A possible answer, however, does not simply consist in choosing for one of these
options. The reason is that the tension between necessity and contingency, subjec-
tivity and ideal objectivity, and history and lawfulness already is present at the heart
of the “original beginnings”.
In the next section (“Original Beginnings and the History of Geometry”), we fol-
low Husserl’s text The Origin of Geometry and spell out the issue at stake in its
most pregnant form. This means that our focus is on the history of geometry, and
on Husserl’s thoughts about its original beginnings in particular. In “Beyond the
Alternative Between History and A-Temporal Ideality?” and “Merleau-Ponty and
History As the Unfolding of Ideality”, we try to get beyond the alternative between
history and a-temporal ideality. Merleau-Ponty’s comments on parts of Husserl’s
The Origin of Geometry, offers valuable efforts to read the tension between his-
tory and ideality not as a contradiction, but as an intimate connection between time
and ideality. In “Ankersmit: History and Historical Experience”, we present some
thoughts on historical experience by Frank Ankersmit (2005) and point to a number
of similarities to and differences with Husserl’s account of the experience of his-
tory. In the final Section, we come back to the status of “original beginnings” and
add some critical remarks. These remarks bear upon the importance of thinking in a
structural way about the possibility of history, and upon the way we understand our
experience with language and cultural meanings, in particular works of art.
O R I G I N A L B E G I N N I N G S A N D T H E H I S T O R Y O F G E O M E T R Y
In The Origin of Geometry, Husserl is concerned with the specific status of ideal
objectivities, in particular those of geometry. He inquires how such objects came to
be, or rather, how they had to come to be considering that geometry is what it is,
i.e. a science of very particular, ideal objectivities. Husserl thus concentrates upon
the constitution of such objectivities, and he clearly demarcates this type of inquiry
from an inquiry into merely historical facts. For him, it makes little sense to focus,
for instance, on Galilei’s particular thoughts in the history of geometry, or on the
particular meaning geometry had in his thinking. The reason is plain: the meaning
that is of interest cannot be different in the mind of Galileo and in that of past or
future geometers. What is looked for, is the original meaning, i.e. the most original
sense in which geometry first arose in history, and this is, to Husserl, the sense in
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T R A N S C E N D E N T A L I S M A N D O R I G I N A L B E G I N N I N G S
which geometry had to appear, “even though we know nothing of the first creators
and are not even asking after them.” (Husserl, 1970: 354) Husserl thus sets up a
historical inquiry into the original beginnings of geometry as they necessarily must
have been in their “primally establishing” function. (Ibid: 354)
He starts from geometry as it presents itself nowadays, a tradition amidst numer-
ous other traditions that is implicitly1 passed on from generation to generation. But
even if it emerged from within our human space out of human activity, the forms
of a tradition cannot be grounded in purely causal terms. A tradition is the frame
within which individual human activity is organized, and as such it requires an un-
derstanding in more than merely material or causal terms; we also need a spiritual
account of it.
In this writing, the constitution of ideal objectivities is described as a process of
gradual detachment or distancing from the factual, or from what is based in con-
tingent encounters and particular acts of consciousness of particular minds. Five
steps are distinguished: (i) the original self-evidence in the first mathematician’s
actual consciousness, which is plainly contingent and factual, (ii) the retention of
this self-evidence and its passive memorization, whereby its permanent character is
increased, even if it is still factually and contingently grounded, (iii) the reactivation
of this original self-evidence in an active memory, allowing for the possibility to
recall the evidence ad infinitum, without having to recall it literally, (iv) the inter-
subjective memory, mediated by language, on the basis of which the self-evidence
can be reactivated and communicated by all those mastering the language, (v) the
memory fixed through writing, a crucial step opening up the perspective of focus-
ing exclusively on the possibility of reactivating the self-evidence, through which a
clear independency is materialized with regard to actual realizations by actual math-
ematicians. In this way, the constitution of ideal, scientific objectivity contributes to
virtualize the factual in as far as there is no longer the need to continuously recall
and factually awaken the original self-evidences, even if there is the possibility to
do so.2
What then can a return to original beginnings as Husserl envisages in The Origin
of Geometry imply? What can be the status and the relevance of an “original self-
evidence”, considering that the constitution of objective ideality seems to involve a
form of structural, “symbolic”, independency in regard to what counts as original
self-evidence or factual realization?3 Clearly, Husserl does not merely have in mind
the return to an original, first, factual realization, even if he claims that there must
have been a first acquisition. Indeed, to him, the challenge of an inquiry into origi-
nal beginnings is to understand how each and every acquisition maintains its validity
in the next step or is persistent in the process in which a tradition is made, build-
ing further upon previous acquisitions and their validities. In Husserl’s phrasing:
“Clearly, then, geometry must have arisen out of a first acquisition, out of first cre-
ative activities. We understand its persisting manner of being: it is not only a mobile
forward process from one set of acquisitions to another but a continuous synthesis
in which all acquisitions maintain their validity, all make up a totality such that, at
every present stage, the total acquisition is, so to speak, the total premise for the
acquisitions of the new level.” (Ibid: 355)
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D E P R E E S T E R H E L E N A A N D G E R T R U D I S VA N D E V I J V E R
Of course, the total meaning of geometry (i.e. as a developed science), as a project
and later as a movement towards its realization, could not be explicitly given in the
original beginnings. There must have been a “more primitive formation of mean-
ing [. . .] as a preliminary stage [. . .]” (Ibid: 356) And this more primitive formation
of meaning must have taken place through the self-evidence of successful real-
ization. To Husserl, self-evidence here refers to the most adequate fulfillment of
consciousness by its object. It is “nothing more than grasping an entity with the
consciousness of its original being-itself-there [Selbst-da]”. (Ibid: 356). An original
being-itself-there and the successful realization of a project are one and the same,
because what is realized is there, originally, as itself.
The basic question of The Origin of Geometry then is how the initial self-
evidence, as based in the subject of the inventor, is to be related to ideal objectivity.
In other words, how to make comprehensible the fact that the objective validity of
geometry presupposes the activity of the mental space of an inventor, while being
also in a peculiar way transcendent with regard to this temporally situated activity.
To Husserl, there is indeed a supratemporal existence involved in geometry, also in
the first establishment (cf. ibid: 356), even if it is not yet “ideal” objectivity. Ideal
objectivity (ideale Gegenständlichkeit), proper to science, is the kind of objectivity
that is identical in all its empirical “translations”. As such, it is similar to other forms
of ideal objectivity present in the cultural world. Husserl mentions spiritual products
such as the constructions of fine literature, and he distinguishes these from other
kinds of objectivities, such as tools (e.g. a hammer) and also architectural products.
The reason for distinguishing the latter from the former, is that the latter are not
amenable to repetition in the same way. The repeatability of e.g. tools is a repeatabil-
ity in many like exemplars, whereas e.g. a theorem “exists only once, no matter how
often or even in what language it may be expressed.” (Ibid: 357) Of course, ideal
objects of any kind can be said to have objective existence in the world, in virtue
of their being expressed, and being endlessly expressable, in language. Moreover,
language itself is made up of ideal objects: “ [. . .] the word Löwe occurs only once
in the German language; it is identical throughout its innumerable utterances by any
given persons.” (Ibid: 357) But the idealities at stake in geometry, however much
they are expressed in language, and however much they presuppose the ideality of
language, are not to be equated to the idealities of linguistic forms. What is brought
to validity as truth in geometry, are ideal geometrical objects, states of affairs, etc.
Nevertheless, there is a most intimate link between language and geometrical
ideality, as it is on the basis of language that ideality can proceed from its intraper-
sonal original to ideal objectivity. “The objective world is from the start the world
for all, the world which ‘everyone’ has as a world-horizon. Its objective being pre-
supposes men, understood as men with a common language.” (Ibid: 359). From the
moment language enters the scene, it is, and must be, a language about something;
to participate in language, is then to participate in this involvement with something.
It is to count on the possibility of a minimal understanding between those who par-
ticipate, prior to all forms of more specific understanding that can be articulated
afterwards. It is, in other words, to inhabit a world as a world of fellow human
beings acknowledging this (minimal) possibility.
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T R A N S C E N D E N T A L I S M A N D O R I G I N A L B E G I N N I N G S
Yet, language alone is not enough. Even if the first mathematician expresses his
inner creation through language – just as any one can make something objective,
communicable, real, by using language – this does not make this creation ideally
objective. The question, therefore, still is how to make the transition from the psy-
chic inner world of the first mathematician to objective ideality, to an intersubjective
existence of an ideal object?
To Husserl, it is clear that the original self-evidence, the original being-itself-there
at the moment of the original beginnings does not automatically imply a persisting
acquisition that could have objective existence. The original, vivid self-evidence
passes and “immediately turns into the passivity of the flowingly fading conscious-
ness of what-has-just-now-been.” (Ibid: 359) However, Husserl immediately adds
the following: “Finally this ‘retention’ disappears, but the ‘disappeared’ passing and
being past has not become nothing for the subject in question: it can be reawakened”
(Ibid: 359, italics added). That the “having disappeared”, the “being-past”, does not
become nothing for the subject in question is important. The past experiencing can
be lived through in the possible activity of a recollection. The originally self-evident
production is recollected and renewed, and this active recollection of what is past
is accompanied by an activity of concurrent actual production. It is precisely this
possibility of actively recollecting that proves or at least indicates that what has dis-
appeared has not become nothing: it cannot have become nothing as it is recollected.
Moreover, and this is crucial to Husserl’s argument, through an original equality
(Deckung) a self-evidence of identity arises: what has now been realized in original
fashion (in the act of recollection) is identified as the same as what was previously
self-evident. It is not a matter of likeness, but of identity, as well as a matter of self-
evidence of this identity. Indeed, it also becomes possible now to “repeat at will the
self-evidence of the identity (coincidence of identity) of the structure throughout the
chain of repetitions.” (Ibid: 360) In other words, what becomes self-evident, is the
capacity to repeat, to do the same, and this presupposes the identification of the old
and new meaning as structurally isomorphic. They must be the same to the extent
that they are identified as the same: the identity is self-evident.4
However, all this happens to the subject and his or her subjective capacities
and does not allow for “objectivity” in the genuine sense. But as soon as we take
into consideration empathy and “fellow man as a community of empathy and of
language” (ibid: 360), reciprocal linguistic understanding comes into view and the
original production can be actively understood by others. Husserl describes this as
follows: “In this full understanding of what is produced by the other, as in the case
of recollection, a present co-accomplishment on one’s own part of the presentified
activity necessarily takes place; but at the same time there is also the self-evident
consciousness of the identity of the mental structure in the productions of both
the receiver of the communication and the communicator; and this occurs recipro-
cally.” (Ibid: 360). In the unity of communication the repeatedly produced structure
becomes an object of consciousness. Again, this object does not appear as a likeness,
but “as the one structure common to all.” (Ibid: 360).5
In a next step in the process of becoming a tradition, the ideal objectivity gains
persisting existence, i.e. also when the inventor and his fellows are not awake or
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no longer alive. Until now, the existence of the “ideal objects” was not permanent,
since there could be times when no one consciously realized them in self-evidence.
It is here that writing fulfills a vital role. Due to writing, factual communication
becomes virtual, and the way man communicates is lifted to a new level. Now,
the geometrical meaning-structure is put into written words, and this writing-down
effects a transformation of its original mode of being: it becomes sedimented. Yet,
the reader can reactivate its self-evidence.
Finally, and often not mentioned in discussions of Husserl’s Origin, logical
inference also is pivotal in this process. Since geometrical science is an immense
construction, and since the capacity for reactivation is limited, reactivation is de
facto not always feasible. “When he [the geometer] returns to the actual continua-
tion of work, must he first run through the whole immense chain of groundings back
to the original premises and actually reactivate the whole thing? If so, a science like
our modern geometry would not be possible at all.” (Ibid: 363) Fortunately, and here
logical inference is at work, if the premises can be reactivated back to the most origi-
nal self-evidence, and if your reasoning is sound, then the self-evident consequences
of the premises can also be reactivated. Of course, this is only valid for deductive
science – history itself, as a science, is not a logical construction. History does not
produce ideal objectivities. In this case, we can never be sure of the possibility of
reactivation. In other words, the “seduction of language” may be more strongly at
work in descriptive disciplines, in the sense that the claimed validities probably are
disappointed by subsequent experience – if this “historical experience” were possi-
ble at all in the first place (cf. “Ankersmit: History and Historical Experience” on
historical experience). Yet Husserl sees this not only as a problem for sciences with
a logical-deductive construction or a construction based on description, but for all
kinds of sedimentations – sedimentations whose content once arose in life itself.
“But propositions, like other cultural structures, appear on the scene in the form
of tradition; they claim, so to speak, to be sedimentations of a truth-meaning that
can be made originally self-evident; whereas it is by no means necessary that they
[actually] have such a meaning, as in the case of associatively derived falsifications.”
(Ibid: 367)
In the final paragraphs of The Origin of Geometry, Husserl answers to the
objection that his undertaking is not history, but epistemology. According to
Husserl, the separation between epistemology and history makes the deepest prob-
lems of history invisible. The knowing Husserl aims at, is not a knowing about an
external causality that determines the course of history. In contrast, it is a know-
ing about the inner structure of meaning that historical facts have, and he proposes
to further disclose the motivational interconnections between historical facts. “All
[merely] factual history remains incomprehensible because, always merely drawing
its conclusions naïvely and straightforwardly from facts, it never makes thematic
the general ground of meaning upon which all such conclusions rest, has never
investigated the immense structural a priori which is proper to it.” (Ibid: 371)
Next to this merely factual history, there is an “internal history”, in which there
is no distinction possible between internal-historical problems and epistemological
problems.
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B E Y O N D T H E A L T E R N A T I V E B E T W E E N H I S T O R Y
A N D A - T E M P O R A L I D E A L I T Y ?
In the year 1959–1960, in his course on Monday at the Collegè de France, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty translates and comments parts of Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry.6
In the next two sections the notes of this course are our point of departure for
a further interpretation of Husserl’s text. Merleau-Ponty extensively comments
on Husserl’s idea that even ideal beings, such as the objectivities of mathemat-
ics, necessarily unfold in the course of time, i.e. in history. Moreover, and as
just explained (cf. supra), ideal beings acquire their ideal meaning only in and
through spoken and written language. Stated differently, both language and his-
tory participate in the formation of ideal being. This is because both the sensible
inscription ànd the objectivity/a-temporality of ideal being is assured by history and
language.
We have seen that The Origin of Geometry explains how every genesis of meaning
presupposes an originary foundation, a Stiftung. Such a Stiftung or creative founda-
tion opens up a field that the creator cannot survey, but in which later geometers can
work, in a tradition of Nachstiftung. The initial steps of geometry therefore have
not only a literal and manifest meaning, but also a surplus of meaning. Geometry is
more than the lived experiences of Galilei and others, and more than these thoughts
reactualized by others. There is a deeper sense, a deeper structure of sense, upon
which thoughts of geometers open. What is opened is a field that is at first only
aimed at, but not yet developed, and which remains present in the whole history of
geometry. Even more, this deeper sense makes geometry into what it is as such, i.e.
as a consistent theory. Merleau-Ponty considers this movement, this opening up of
a field, as a model for conceiving not only the history of geometry, but universal
history. And in whatever history, the opening of a field is something suprapersonal.
The field laid open, initiated by an original acquisition, is not organized according
to causal relations, but is seized by a necessity. To take this into account, the notions
of fact and essence, real and ideal have to be reconsidered. To Merleau-Ponty, the
basic challenge is to conceive of an ideality that requires time. The most impor-
tant idea for the present contribution, is that the original beginnings, the originary
meaning, can be reactualized in the future. According to Merleau-Ponty, the origi-
nal beginnings, the moment of self-evidence, is the place where a chiasmus occurs
between me and the other, between past, present and future. As such, the chiasmus
is the depth of life itself.
If the origin of geometry is to be thought, and if we do not want to lapse into
a psychological history, e.g. of Galilei’s thinking, how, then, do we have to con-
sider the history of geometry? What kind of history do we have to conceive of?
Geometry, in its development, is not the same as the lived thought of geometers at
work. How then, are we to say something about the original acquisition? And are
we gaining something by attempting to say something about the original acquisi-
tion? Experience is, after all, of the order of the psychological and the empirical.
The opening of a field, however, is something suprapersonal. This is, in a nutshell,
how Merleau-Ponty frames the tension between factual existence and ideality.
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The question therefore seems to be how a meaning can arise which is not confined
by the thought of one or more persons. According to Merleau-Ponty, the original
meaning, which opens up the ontological space of the first propositions, is pre-ideal.
However, the Urstiftung of meaning is not a recorded fact, but is something consid-
ered as a necessity in the geometry which results from it. Does this way of reasoning
lead to “ideal” history? Is this history then about the genesis of meaning or about the
meaning of genesis? If the original beginnings are not searched for in the thinking
of geometers or in their works, if they are searched for in a certain idea that we have
about what they necessarily must have been, is this not contriving ideal history?
If this were the sense that we attribute to the genesis of geometry, wouldn’t it be the
case that our construction is merely ideal or purely linked to the present? Yet Husserl
resists a history that would be purely present or ideal. According to Merleau-Ponty,
he wants an inquiry into the meaning or essence of geometry which does not appeal
to an a-temporal ideality that would dominate the genesis and engulf it. The history
of geometry, or the genesis of its meaning, is not some construction that merely hap-
pens from our present point of view, i.e. as a merely ideal construction. This would
swallow up history in a kind of a-temporality. In contrast, the history of geometry
should reveal a movement of meaning, i.e. truly a genesis of meaning. By historical
reflection, we find the living current of the internal meaning, i.e. what this current
necessarily must be in its becoming. What we have to do, is to look at the crucial
steps in this process of becoming, in order to see the inner, living sense of history.7
According to Merleau-Ponty, what is seized in the original beginning is not
a-temporal: the research does not yet contain its results, and reflection upon the
results is not a simple analysis. The total meaning is not exhausted in the found-
ing act, and it is precisely for this reason that ideality needs history! In the words
of Merleau-Ponty: “Thus its total meaning is not exhausted in the founding act.”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1998: 24; our translation).8
Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty, history precisely is the place of ideality.
Therefore, we have to overcome the alternative between history and ideality by a
historicity which is not merely causal. We have to consider historicity as opening,
as Ineinander of present and past, as an intentional historicity (ibid: 22). In the next
section, we have a closer look at the historical process and its relation to ideality in
Merleau-Ponty.
M E R L E A U - P O N T Y A N D H I S T O R Y A S T H E U N F O L D I N G
O F I D E A L I T Y
Let us get back to the core problem. The problem that Husserl addresses is that
geometry is, in the originary act, just a moment of personal life. At first sight, it
seems to be written language that has the power to give geometry, outside of the
space of consciousness of its inventor, the status of ideal objectivity. Of course, it is
never an ideal being that is in the world; the expressions of meaning (Bedeutung) are
in the world, in space and in time. Thus, geometry is objectified only insofar as the
content of one’s thoughts is expressed. Thanks to expression, the psychic content of
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the creator can become “objective”, “experienceable”, nameable. But the intersub-
jective being as ideal being (ideale Gegenständlichkeit) still is completely different
from the psychic-real (psychisch-Reales). How, then, does this ideality originate?
The answer is as simple as it is ingenious. It is because the original accom-
plishment never becomes nothing: in passing by, the original accomplishment
becomes passive, but it can be reawakened. That there is a possibility of reawak-
ening something, that there is the possibility of attaining self-evidence of identity
in this reawakening, that is what potentially makes geometry into something ideally
objective. If there would not be a possibility of reawakening, or no longer a need
to do so, geometry would be confined to pure formalism. So, in the recollection
(Wiedererinnerung) there is the identification with an original accomplishment, and
there is consciousness of an identity between something that was produced before, at
whatever time of origin, and what is quasi-produced in the recollection. Through the
process of identification (self-evidence of the identity), it becomes clear that it was
precisely the original accomplishment that also stiftet this possibility of reactivation
and of identity. In this sense, the recollection in which the original accomplishment
is reactivated, differs from “ordinary” recollections, such as the recollection of a
perception. In the recollection of a perception, there is no establishment of self-
evidence of identity; the perception is not actual in the recollection, but is merely
there as the retention of a retention of a retention etc.
It can be said, with Merleau-Ponty, that Husserl does not seek to explain ideality
by language: this would imply a renunciation of phenomenology (ibid: 27). On the
one hand, ideality does emerge in language, but it cannot be reduced to a content
of language. On the other hand, ideality does not dominate language as a superior
possibility. Ideality is the hinge of the connection between me and the other, and
operates in (and only in!) this connection. Ideality is realized by this connection
between me and the other – a connection enabled by language. In sum, ideality and
intersubjectivity are two sides of the same coin.
Language is also what changes the modus of being of ideality: words (spoken or
written) exist objectively like physical things, and it is thanks to speech or writing
that meaning can be reactivated. Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty, ideality some-
how seems to exist before it is expressed, but not in the status of “objective” ideality.
However, expression, and writing in particular, is not merely a means for trans-
mitting meaning, but it transforms the original accomplishment into a stabilized
accomplishment. This means that the accomplishment is passed, but at the same
time it has become available for others. The sedimentation in writing is this avail-
ability. Most importantly, the sedimentation and the concurrent availability is a part
of the thought, and not merely decoration added to the thought. The sedimentation
of the thought is the realization itself of the thought (ibid: 29).9
Of course, how can we understand this meaning that can be reactivated? What is
this meaning that we can share with the past? We find a message in the past, without
knowing who the sender is. According to Merleau-Ponty, the internal character of
geometry is to be a message from someone to someone. And our ignorance of the
empirical origin of this message guarantees that the message has a human origin,
that the communication is human. The obscurity of the empirical origin testifies
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that what is created had the possibility to survive in some other way than merely
as a past which has passed. In contrast, it has survived as something which can
inhabit all spirits. This is precisely what Merleau-Ponty calls tradition: tradition is
the forgetting of the empirical origins in order to be eternal origin. This is also why
the becoming of history is not merely a causal way of becoming, but a spiritual one.
And ideality is that which emerges in a history that I can repeat. So, in Merleau-
Ponty’s analysis, like in Husserl’s text itself, there is no separation between ideality
and history, but ideality precisely unfolds in history.
But, to return to the beginning, how do we have to consider ideality in the space
of personal consciousness of the inventor? Although Merleau-Ponty calls it a pre-
ideal ideality, we cannot simply refuse all a-temporal ideal being to it. If we did,
isn’t it the case that only isolated, and hence, psychic facts would remain, without
any ideality at all? But if thought were founded immediately upon a-temporal ideal
being, we would lose history. So, what is there since the Urstiftung that founds its
universal validity, its ideality?
We know that it is on the basis of speech that Bedeutung appears in the world.
Becoming causal and becoming spiritual happens in one and the same movement!
Acts of expression have two layers: an ideal meaning and a sensible incarnation
that does not compromise the ideal meaning. But how does it happen that in ex-
pression ideality becomes objective? And, again, is ideal being already attained
in the interior of the geometer? In order to answer these questions, we have to
turn back to Husserl’s most simple but ingenious solution: there is a surpassing
of the psychic-real in the inventor, because the production is not only retained as
a dated event which will never be as if it never had happened. This is the crux of
the matter. Original beginnings – and that is why they possibly are original begin-
nings – are retained in a peculiar way: they are exactly, and only, that which can
be, and has to be, reactivated (cf. supra the difference with the recollection of a
perception).
In the recollection of original beginnings, there is actual renewal of that produc-
tion, there is a re-comprehension of the productions of the other, the recreation of
them when I am told about it. Moreover, this happens through the identification with
the production of the other. What is produced in me and in the other does not simply
have a relation of resemblance, it is not that there is likeness between both, but they
are one and the same. In other words, the process is one of identification.
Ideality is thus something more specific than mere intersubjectivity: it is not just
something psychic-objective. In Merleau-Pontian terms: ideality is not parole parlée
but parole parlante. Because of parole parlante, a co-production is possible. Ideality
is not causally dragged out of language. Ideality is this possibility of equivalence,
of identification, between me and the other.
Writing founds the permanence of the ideality outside experiences of empathy
(Einfühlung). In writing, the ideal world becomes sedimented. Sedimentation, for-
getting, is not a failing of ideality; it is constitutive of ideality (see also supra the
notion of tradition). And since we cannot reactivate everything, the possibility of
being mistaken (cf. the seduction of language) is also the possibility of truth.
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A N K E R S M I T : H I S T O R Y A N D H I S T O R I C A L E X P E R I E N C E
For Ankersmit (2005), openness to the past asks for a submission to the spell
of the moment. This openness to the past is essential to historical experience
(Ankersmit, 2005: 16). In historical experience, it is as if a remote personal past
comes to life again. This shift from the historical to the historical experience,
which is itself a-historical, is not a transcendence of history in order to arrive at
time-transcending truths. Historical experience is only possible in a cross-sectional
approach (Querschnitt), not by placing something within a chronological and narra-
tive context, but by decontextualizing elements subsumed under cross-sections. The
past should be dissolved in individual “atoms”; this is the only way in which the
past can become an object of historical experience (Ibid: 167). “As long as these
atoms have their fixed place in the endless chain of events reaching from the past
to the present, as long as we can get access to them only by carefully following the
chain itself, all contact with the past will be indirect and mediated by this chain of
events. The event, or the past, is then a product or function of the chain of events,
and we will never succeed in disentangling it from the cloak of what surrounds
it” (Ibid: 167). This description of chaining up historical events can be read as a
Husserlian seduction of language,10 in which one gets stuck, or simply relies on
the chain of reasonings, without ever aiming at the reactivation of an original be-
ginning, i.e. a moment that cannot be thought, but of which the identity with the
original beginnings must be experienced as self-evident. This is Ankersmit’s reason
for decontextualizing the event, which is a condition for having a historical experi-
ence. Works of art can pre-eminently lead us into historical experience. The reason
is that the work of art, as a remnant of earlier times, carries a meaning that “will
never surrender to the powers of history” (Ibid: 167). As such, it is – together with
writings – an essential element in historical experience. It is here that we can ex-
perience the past, because, here, the past “is a past denuded of the protective shell
of narrative in which nineteenth-century historism had always wrapped it; it is a
past that we encounter as we look at a painting and where all that truly counts hap-
pens between the painting and ourselves – [. . .]” (Ibid: 168). Historism, we may
say, uses the seduction of language in an effort to know the past or in order to con-
nect to the past. The historical experience, in contrast, is an experience that is not
concerned with putting what we have discovered from the past into a temporal or-
der (beginning – middle – end), and therefore it may be called a-historical. In the
words of Ankersmit: “One first has to historicize everything with the historist, so
that one can make, with Burckhardt, this movement of dehistoricizing what was
historicized [. . .].” (Ibid: 169). Here, Joseph von Eichendorff’s insight that in his-
torical experience present (subject) and past (object) meet each other “cleaned of all
their historical denominations” (ibid: 169) is repeated.
Moreover, and still according to Ankersmit, the past becomes past if there is
an irreparable rupture, such as the Revolution in France, because of which a pre-
revolutionary identity is lost and a new one is constituted. The previous order is
gone forever and the old identity cannot be recovered. Under these circumstances,
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a desire to know the past arises – a desire that substitutes the desire of being what
is lost. “History became an object of knowledge, an object of research forever sep-
arated from the world of the subject, of the historian. The past became a world
successfully resisting any attempt to restore the union of being and knowledge.”
(Ibid: 327) We have been expelled from the past, because of some event that caused
an irreparable rupture between past and present. This leads to a desire for knowing
the past.
For Husserl, in contrast, the possibility of reactivation presupposes that what is
reactivated is not strange to us, once reactivated. Even more, we identify it with
the same self-evidence as the original inventor did. Husserl seems concerned, not
about what inevitably slips away, but about what from the past can still be recov-
ered in the present. And this seems limited to what has acquired general validity.
But then the question rises again if this is to be called “history”, i.e. if all what fails
of this identification (i.e. what cannot be reactivated) is principally excluded. Not
only is history’s radical difference avoided, but also the question about our rela-
tion to it does not figure in Husserl’s account. The reason why is plain: Husserl’s
question is not a question for contingency, for the merely empirical and factual.
Yet, Ankersmit’s account, e.g. of the power of a work of art, does not take into
account the spiritual, ideal dimension of it, which, in Husserl’s account, is solely
responsible for our present possibility to reactualize the self-evidence of its identity.
Another difference between Husserl and Ankersmit, is that historical experience is
sublime for Ankersmit, but not for Husserl. The reactivation in a Husserlian sense is
more a matter of adequate identification with a past production, whereas historical
experience is for Ankersmit a matter of sublime dissociation. It is precisely the dis-
sociation between past and present that is constitutive of the sublime. Nevertheless,
the following description of the experience of the past is not incongruent with
Husserl’s intentions, if history is indeed not conceived as a mere concatenation of
empirical facts, but as the dimension in which idealities unfold and are taken up
by subjects past, present and future. “The experience of the past, as described in
Hegel’s account, is a movement both within and against history: it is, at the same
time, the deepest and most intense experience of the past and a stepping outside
the realm of history.” (Ibid: 344) For Ankersmit, however, sublime experience also
involves a dissociation of a former self from the self that we are after having had
the sublime experience in question. In the Husserlian reactivation of an original
meaning-formation, there also is what can be called a “loss of identity of the self”,
since in reactivating a historical accomplishment, my accomplishment is identical
with the original accomplishment. Here, in this experience, I do aim at reactivating
someone else’s thoughts. These thoughts, however, from the start did not belong
solely to the original thinker either; the possibility of communication, empathy and
thus intersubjectivity is present from the very beginning. This “distance” between
the thought and the thinker is a distance that implies the space of intersubjectivity.
Yet, for Ankersmit, the dissociation is more straightforwardly a dissociation be-
tween identities. Ankersmit thus writes: “ [. . .] it is the kind of experience which
involves our identity in the sense that the experience makes us look at ourselves
from the perspective of the outsider; we look at ourselves as if we were looking at
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somebody else. Put differently, we suddenly become aware of a previous identity of
ourselves, of the kind of person that we had been up to now and had never realized
that we were, and this we can do only thanks to our having acquired a new iden-
tity.” (Ibid: 349) Near the end of the quote, the difference between the views of
Ankersmit and Husserl become apparent again: there is no identification with the
other for Ankersmit, whereas for Husserl this is precisely the precondition, not for
ruptures in history, but for the constitution of a tradition. This brings us back to their
different points of departure: thinking the past as past and as radically different but
allowing sublime historical experience, or thinking the past as constitutive of tradi-
tions and based on the possible reactivation of thoughts thought before us, and on
the identity of meaning in these thoughts.
C O N C L U S I O N S
Our presentation of Husserl’s view on history, starting from his Origin of Geometry,
in confrontation with Ankersmit’s focus on the sublime experience, can enable us
to conclude the following.
Firstly, it seems to us important to underline the fact that Husserl, with his work
on the Origin, but also with his Crisis, contributes to the idea – even if he fails
to make it fully explicit – that the possibility of history can only by grasped in
structural terms. Or rather, to write history means to occupy a place in it, i.e. to
identify oneself as having a place among other places. We have interpreted Husserl’s
stress on “Deckung” in these terms, as a requirement of realization of self-evidence
of identity. This realization implies a movement of identification, which seems to
us to be the central idea in Husserl’s text, but which would clearly require further
elaboration. Identification indeed is a process, as Merleau-Ponty also beautifully
illustrates, a movement as well as a grasping of a movement as a movement of a
certain kind, which results in the positing of an identity and which has a number
of consequences. It makes a difference to identify, and in a sense it does not matter
what the content of identification is. This idea can refer to the specific status of
reflection in a critical viewpoint: to reflect is to presentify things in a mediated way.
Mediated, this means that it is about something – and it has to be about something,
otherwise there is only either pure empirical stimulation or pure formalization –
but it also means that it implies an acknowledgment of the proper place. Husserl,
perhaps more explicitly than Merleau-Ponty, stresses, on the basis of a radicalized
form of cartesian meditation, that the refusal of the pure stimulus as well as of pure
formalization that is at stake in identification and that makes it so different from pure
identity, involves a point of abyss, a passage through hell. This passage through hell
is “the loss of identity” that enters the scene from the moment the logic is that of
identification.
The advantage of Ankersmit is that he has the potential to critically under-
mine accounts that have attained a form of self-sufficiency in which this “loss
of identity” is lost sight of. This can happen in post-modern as well as in tran-
scendental accounts. But one can wonder if he does not himself recover another
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kind of self-sufficiency, that of the fullness of the experience in the sublime, for
instance.
Second, it is remarkable that works of art figure pre-eminently, albeit at the
same time in passing, in the accounts by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Ankersmit.
Husserl, due to his focus on pure ideality, is obliged to distinguish two kinds of
works of art: “fine literature”, which is capable to present ideal meanings as some-
how independent of the specific material embodiment that accompanies it, and more
“materialized” works of art (e.g. the products of architecture), in which a layer of
pure meaning is not so easily discernible or conceivable apart from the material
specificities of it. It is well known that Merleau-Ponty resists the idea that there is a
layer of ideal meaning that can be isolated (even if this happens merely in thought)
from the material form in which the meaning appears. And for Merleau-Ponty, this
is true both for visual arts and for literature. Meaning is always structured in a form,
and this form cannot be thought as “pure” or not materialized (cf. Merleau-Ponty,
1942). That ideality needs history is the very same idea: ideality is embodied, both
in historical time and in matter. As both history and matter preclude a pure form
of ideality, the process of identification is difficult to think of as a process that only
involves ideality. It is true that Husserl takes into account writing (as an embodiment
of ideality), but it is also true that the most intimate intertwining between ideality
and materiality – as Merleau-Ponty (1942) describes it – remains an obstacle for him
for thinking the cultural tradition of works of art that are not amenable to pure ideal-
ity (as is for Husserl the case for “fine literature”). Nevertheless, as Merleau-Ponty
considers some works of art as an Urstiftung, he recovers the Husserlian idea of
original beginnings without succumbing to the call of pure ideality, but while hold-
ing onto the idea that their meaning-structure is not reducible to a causal or purely
material history. The way history is conceived of, thus turns out to be decisive not
only for our relation to a history of art, but more importantly for a point of view on
the way we can experience art. Vice versa, the status of a work of art in philosophy
can be revealing for philosophy’s point of view on the status of history and ideality.
An account of the status of the work of art necessarily implies an account of the sta-
tus of meaning and its relation to history. As such, it can be said that a philosophy
of the work of art also is a philosophy of history.
For Ankersmit, the work of art is something that resists – in Husserlian terms –
the seduction of language; we can have immediate experience of it, unmediated by
history. As the examples he gives, mostly are examples from literature, we should be
watchful here. It might be the case that his choices are motivated by an underlying
but not explicated view on what works of art convey through time. In a rather unex-
pected way, it might be that Ankersmit is in agreement here with Husserl’s view on
the work of art, especially literature, as capable of having pure meaning. If sublime
experience is possible, this might be the case because the very specific material (and
historical!) conditions can be neglected in his view.
In our view, the distinctions that are at play here, are all to be related to the issue of
identification, as indeed, to identify is to select and hence to neglect certain aspects
of the thing one is directed upon – it is in this sense a loss of identity – but it is also
a recovery of identity at a different level. The constraint, indeed, is the possibility.
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N O T E S
1 The way in which a tradition comes into being and develops, is not necessarily a matter of explicitly
and consciously building and developing this tradition. A number of passages in the Crisis point to the
rather implicit way in which a tradition is developed. In the following passage, Husserl is discussing
Descartes. “After Galileo had carried out, slightly earlier, the primal establishment of the new natural
science, it was Descartes who conceived and at the same time set in systematic motion the new idea of
universal philosophy [. . .]. And immediately it had a powerful effect.
This does not mean, then (in accord with our exposition above], that he had fully and systematically
thought out this idea in advance, much less that his contemporaries and successors, constantly guided by
it in the sciences, had it in mind in explicit form. For this it would have been necessary to have the higher
systematic development of pure mathematics under the new idea of universality which appears in its first,
relative maturity in Leibniz [. . .] and which is now, in more mature form, still a subject of lively research
as the mathematics of definite manifolds. Like all historical ideas that result in great developments,
those in the new mathematics, the new natural science, and the new philosophy live in very diverse
noetic modes in the consciousness of the persons who function as the bearers of their development:
sometimes they strive forward like instincts, without these persons having any ability to give an account
of where they are going; sometimes they are the results of a more or less clear realization, as plainly and
simply grasped goals, possibly crystallizing into ever more precise goals through repeated consideration”
(Husserl, 1970: 73–74, italics added).
In another passage, concerning rationalism, Husserl states the following: “Borne by the same spirit,
all the new sciences seem to succeed, even the highest, metaphysics. Where physicalistic rationalism
could not be carried through in earnest, as precisely in the case of metaphysics, aid was sought in unclear
qualifications, through the use of variations of Scholastic concepts. For the most part, in fact, the guiding
sense of the new rationality was not precisely thought out, even though it was the driving force behind the
movements. Its explicitation in more precise terms was itself a part of philosophy’s intellectual labor . . . ”
(Husserl, 1970: 64).
2 When Husserl speaks about a “crisis” of the European sciences, he intends precisely the radical carry-
ing through of this project of virtualization, leading to a surreptitious replacement of the world in which
we live by a world of objectivistic truths, presented as the truths that are valid independently from any
form of actuality and embodiment, and no longer calling for a realization from within the “lifeworld”.
3 That objective ideality involves a form of structural, symbolic autonomy, does not mean that it can be
equated to it. In the Crisis, Husserl introduces at various places the idea of symbolism to refer to a form
of structural detachment from intuition. Referring to Galilei’s thinking, he notes that the “philosopher of
nature and ‘trail-blazer’ of physics, was not yet a physicist in the full present-day sense; that his thinking
did not, like that of our mathematicians and mathematical physicists, move in the sphere of symbolism,
far removed from intuition”. (Husserl, 1970: 24). He also uses the word to capture the idea of emptying
of meaning: “Of course one does not calculate ‘mechanically’, as in ordinary numerical calculation; one
thinks, one invents, one may make great discoveries – but they have acquired, unnoticed, a displaced,
‘symbolic’ meaning. Later this becomes a fully conscious methodical displacement, a methodical tran-
sition from geometry, for example, to pure analysis, treated as a science in its own right.” (Husserl,
1970: 45).
4 That is what the word “Deckung” refers to in this context.
5 We can wonder whether the order of treatment in the constitution of ideal objectivity is not in part
responsible for the discussions that followed it and of which we present here a very fragmented image.
Because indeed, one can ask what can be the status of the self-evidence of identity in a particular subject
that is not yet part of language and does not communicate. Of course, Husserl acknowledges that it
is only through communication, and further through writing, that ideal objectivity can emerge. But is
it possible, even if only in thought, to isolate a subject capable of producing self-evident “Deckung”?
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Or rather, is it relevant at all to think of a subject that genuinely identifies something as structurally
isomorphic while not having articulated its structural embeddedness in a language community? Should it
not be more relevant to think, the other way around, about the capacities of identification of self-evidence
from within a certain form of communicability and writing? It seems to us that Husserl is perhaps too
faithful to a (conscious) subject that disposes of capacities of identification and self-evidence, that in a
sense subsists in isolation from its linguistic capacities. In our view, it is precisely this point that explains
the uneasiness some authors have in regard to the view he presents on ideal objectivity. We are thinking
of Derrida here (a.o. 1967), but also of psychoanalytic thinkers inspired by Freud and Lacan, who stress
much more radically the idea that subjectivity emerges with and within language, as well as the idea that
the subject is part and parcel of language in such a radical way that it is continuously at the verge of
loosing its identifiability as a “point of consciousness present to itself (cf. De Preester and Van de Vijver,AQ2
2005). To think in this way indeed involves a totally different view on the subject, of which it can be said
that Husserl announces a number of aspects, but does not really articulate or take up the consequences.
We are thinking here, for instance, of what he says on the drive and on instincts (see note 1 and 3), that
could be pertinently related to the debate on consciousness and the unconscious.
6 These notes from 1959–1960 are published for the first time in 1998 in the volume Notes de cours sur
‘‘L’Origine de la Géométrie’’ de Husserl – suivi de “Recherches sur la Phénoménologie de Merleau-
Ponty”, edited by Renaud Barbaras. A (very short, 12 page–) summary of these courses is part of
Résumés de cours – Collège de France 1952–1960 (Gallimard, 1968). In 1961, Jacques Derrida edited
his translation of and comments on Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry. These were published in 1962.
7 It seems to us that what Merleau-Ponty touches upon is, once again, the issue of structural autonomy.
It is certainly the case that he attempts, as did Husserl, to express the idea that something is qualitatively
different from the “first intuition of the first mathematician”, something that is in this sense “suprap-
ersonal” and a-temporal. This refers, in our view, to the idea that things are organized or structured in
a certain way, which implies certain possible and other impossible movements. This is also in agree-
ment with Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental viewpoint on structure extensively elaborated in La Structure
du Comportement (1942). However, Merleau-Ponty, perhaps more overtly than Husserl, indicates that
there is, and there has to be, a participation in a movement of meaning that is situated in a space of
possible movements. Both authors do however express the idea that history requires participation.
8 Our translation of: “Donc son sens ne s’épuise pas dans l’acte fondateur.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1998: 24).
9 Cf. “La sédimentation, c’est cette disponibilité, elle fait partie de la pensée, elle n’en est pas une
décoration. [. . .] La pensée: la sédimentation est sa réalisation comme pensée.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1998:
29).
10 See also both in Husserl and Ankersmit the use of the word “association” for describing this process.
Ankersmit describes history as the “art of association” (Ankersmit, 2005: 344).
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